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Abstract
In the context of multi-player, general-sum games,
there is an increasing interest in solution concepts
modeling some form of communication among
players, since they can lead to socially better out-
comes with respect to Nash equilibria, and may
be reached through learning dynamics in a decen-
tralized fashion. In this paper, we focus on coarse
correlated equilibria (CCEs) in sequential games.
First, we complete the picture on the complexity
of finding social-welfare-maximizing CCEs by
showing that the problem is not in Poly-APX un-
lessP =NP. Furthermore, simple arguments show
that CFR—working with behavioral strategies—
may not converge to a CCE. However, we devise
a simple variant (CFR-S) which provably con-
verges to the set of CCEs, but may be empirically
inefficient. Thus, we design a variant of the CFR
algorithm (called CFR-Jr) which approaches the
set of CCEs with a regret bound sub-linear in the
size of the game, and is shown to be dramatically
faster than CFR-S and the state-of-the-art algo-
rithms to compute CCEs.
1. Introduction
A number of recent studies explore relaxations of the classi-
cal notion of equilibrium (i.e., Nash equilibrium (NE) (Nash,
1951)), allowing to model communication among the play-
ers (Barman & Ligett, 2015; Farina et al., 2018a; Roughgar-
den, 2009). Communication naturally brings about the possi-
bility of playing correlated strategies. These are customarily
modeled through a trusted external mediator who privately
recommends actions to the players (Aumann, 1974). In
particular, a correlated strategy is a correlated equilibrium
(CE) if each player has no incentive to deviate from the rec-
ommendation, assuming the other players would not deviate
either. A popular variation of the CE is the coarse correlated
equilibrium (CCE), which only prevents deviations before
knowing the recommendation (Moulin & Vial, 1978). In se-
quential games, CEs and CCEs are well-suited for scenarios
where the players have limited communication capabilities
and can only communicate before the game starts, such
as, e.g., military settings where field units have no time or
means of communicating during a battle, collusion in auc-
tions where communication is illegal during bidding, and,
in general, any setting with costly communication channels
or blocking environments.
CCEs present a number of appealing properties. A CCE can
be reached through simple (no-regret) learning dynamics
in a decentralized fashion (Foster & Vohra, 1997; Hart &
Mas-Colell, 2000), and, in several classes of games (such
as, e.g., normal-form and succinct games (Papadimitriou
& Roughgarden, 2008; Jiang & Leyton-Brown, 2015)), it
can be computed exactly in time polynomial in the size
of the input. Furthermore, an optimal (i.e., social-welfare-
maximizing) CCE may provide arbitrarily larger welfare
than an optimal CE, which, in turn, may provide arbitrarily
better welfare than an optimal NE (Celli et al., 2019). Al-
though the problem of finding an optimal CCE is NP-hard
for some game classes (such as, e.g., graphical, polyma-
trix, congestion, and anonymous games (Barman & Ligett,
2015)), Roughgarden (2009) shows that the CCEs reached
through regret-minimizing procedures have near-optimal
social welfare when the (λ, µ)-smoothness condition holds.
This happens, e.g., in some specific auctions, congestion
games, and even in Bayesian settings, as showed by Hartline
et al. (2015)). Thus, decentralized computation via learning
dynamics, computational efficiency, and welfare optimality
make the CCE one of the most interesting solution concepts
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for practical applications. However, the problem of comput-
ing CCEs has been addressed only for some specific games
with particular structures (Barman & Ligett, 2015; Hartline
et al., 2015). In this work, we study how to compute CCEs
in the general class of games which are sequential, general-
sum, and multi-player. This is a crucial advancement of
CCE computation, as sequential games provide a model for
strategic interactions which is richer and more adherent to
real-world situations than the normal form.
In sequential games, it is known that, when there are two
players without chance moves, an optimal CCE can be com-
puted in polynomial time (Celli et al., 2019). Celli et al.
(2019) also provide an algorithm (with no polynomiality
guarantees) to compute solutions in multi-player games, us-
ing a column-generation procedure with a MILP pricing
oracle. As for computing approximate CCEs, in the normal-
form setting, any Hannan consistent regret-minimizing pro-
cedure for simplex decision spaces may be employed to
approach the set of CCEs (Blum & Monsour, 2007; Cesa-
Bianchi & Lugosi, 2006)—the most common of such tech-
niques is regret matching (RM) (Blackwell et al., 1956;
Hart & Mas-Colell, 2000). However, approaching the set
of CCEs in sequential games is more demanding. One
could represent the sequential game with its equivalent nor-
mal form and apply RM to it. However, this would result
in a guarantee on the cumulative regret which would be
exponential in the size of the game tree (see Section 2).
Thus, reaching a good approximation of a CCE could re-
quire an exponential number of iterations. The problem
of designing learning algorithms avoiding the construction
of the normal form has been successfully addressed in se-
quential games for the two-player, zero-sum setting. This
is done by decomposing the overall regret locally at the
information sets of the game (Farina et al., 2018b). The
most widely adopted of such approaches are counterfac-
tual regret minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al., 2008) and
CFR+ (Tammelin et al., 2015; Tammelin, 2014), which orig-
inated variants such as (Brown & Sandholm, 2018a; Brown
et al., 2018). These techniques were the key for many recent
remarkable results (Bowling et al., 2015; Brown & Sand-
holm, 2017; 2018b; Moravcˇík et al., 2017). However, these
algorithms work with players’ behavioral strategies rather
than with correlated strategies, and, thus, they are not guar-
anteed to approach CCEs in general-sum games, even with
two players. The only known theoretical guarantee of CFR
when applied to multi-player, general-sum games is that it
excludes dominated actions (Gibson, 2013). Some works
also attempt to apply CFR to multi-player, zero-sum games,
see, e.g., (Risk & Szafron, 2010).
Original contributions First, we complete the picture on
the computational complexity of finding an optimal CCE
in sequential games, showing that the problem is inapprox-
imable (i.e., not in Poly-APX) unless P = NP in games with
three or more players (chance included). In the rest of the
paper, we focus on how to compute approximate CCEs in
multi-player, general-sum, sequential games using no-regret-
learning procedures. We start pointing out simple examples
where CFR-like algorithms available in the literature cannot
be directly employed to our purpose, as they only provide
players’ average strategies whose product is not guaranteed
to converge to an approximate CCE. However, we show
how CFR can be easily adapted to approach the set of CCEs
in multi-player, general-sum sequential games by resorting
to sampling procedures (we call the resulting, naive algo-
rithm CFR-S). Then, we design an enhanced version of
CFR (called CFR-Jr) which computes an averaged corre-
lated strategy which is guaranteed the convergence to an
approximate CCE with a bound on the regret sub-linear in
the size of the game tree. The key component of CFR-Jr is
a polynomial-time algorithm which constructs, at each itera-
tion, the players’ normal-form strategies by working on the
game tree, avoiding to build the (exponential-sized) normal-
form representation. We evaluate the scalability of CFR-S
and CFR-Jr on standard testbeds. While both algorithms
solve instances which are orders of magnitude larger than
those solved by previous state-of-the-art CCE-finding tech-
niques, CFR-Jr dramatically outperforms CFR-S. Moreover,
CFR-Jr proved to be a good heuristic to compute optimal
CCEs, returning nearly-socially-optimal solutions in all the
instances of our testbeds.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some basic concepts which
are used in the rest of the paper (see Shoham & Leyton-
Brown (2008) and Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi (2006) for further
details).
2.1. Extensive-form games and relevant solution
concepts
We focus on extensive-form games (EFGs) with imperfect
information and perfect recall. We denote the set of players
as P ∪ {c}, where c is the Nature (chance) player (rep-
resenting exogenous stochasticity) selecting actions with
a fixed known probability distribution. H is the set of
nodes of the game tree, and a node h ∈ H is identified
by the ordered sequence of actions from the root to the
node. Z ⊆ H is the set of terminal nodes, which are the
leaves of the game tree. For every h ∈ H \ Z, we let
P (h) be the unique player who acts at h and A(h) be the
set of actions she has available. We write h · a to denote
the node reached when a ∈ A(h) is played at h. For each
player i ∈ P , ui : Z → R is the payoff function. We
denote by ∆ the maximum range of payoffs in the game,
i.e., ∆ = maxi∈P (maxz∈Z ui(z)−minz∈Z ui(z)).
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We represent imperfect information using information sets
(from here on, infosets). Any infoset I belongs to a unique
player i, and it groups nodes which are indistinguishable
for that player, i.e., A(h) = A(h′) for any pair of nodes
h, h′ ∈ I . Ii denotes the set of all player i’s infosets, which
form a partition of {h ∈ H | P (h) = i}. We denote by
A(I) the set of actions available at infoset I . In perfect-
recall games, the infosets are such that no player forgets
information once acquired.
We denote with pii a behavioral strategy of player i, which is
a vector defining a probability distribution at each player i’s
infoset. Given pii, we let pii,I be the (sub)vector representing
the probability distribution at I ∈ Ii, with pii,I,a denoting
the probability of choosing action a ∈ A(I).
An EFG has an equivalent tabular (normal-form) representa-
tion. A normal-form plan for player i is a vector σi ∈ Σi =×I∈Ii A(I) which specifies an action for each player i’s in-
foset. Then, an EFG is described through a |P|-dimensional
matrix specifying a utility for each player at each joint
normal-form plan σ ∈ Σ =×i∈P Σi. The expected payoff
of player i, when she plays σi ∈ Σi and the opponents
play normal-form plans in σ−i ∈ Σ−i =×j 6=i∈P Σj , is de-
noted, with an overload of notation, by ui(σi, σ−i). Finally,
a normal-form strategy xi is a probability distribution over
Σi. We denote by Xi the set of the normal-form strategies
of player i. Moreover, X denotes the set of joint probability
distributions defined over Σ.
We also introduce the following notation. We let ρpii be
a vector in which each component ρpiiz is the probability
of reaching the terminal node z ∈ Z, given that player
i adopts the behavioral strategy pii and the other players
play so as to reach z. Similarly, given a normal-form plan
σi ∈ Σi, we define the vector ρσi . Moreover, with an abuse
of notation, ρpiiI and ρ
σi
I denote the probability of reaching
infoset I ∈ Ii. Finally, Z(σi) ⊆ Z is the subset of terminal
nodes which are (potentially) reachable if player i plays
according to σi ∈ Σi.
The classical notion of CE by Aumann (1974) models cor-
relation via the introduction of an external mediator who,
before the play, draws the joint normal-form plan σ∗ ∈ Σ
according to a publicly known x∗ ∈ X , and privately com-
municates each recommendation σ∗i to the corresponding
player. After observing their recommended plan, each
player decides whether to follow it or not. A CCE is a
relaxation of the CE, defined by Moulin & Vial (1978),
which enforces protection against deviations which are in-
dependent from the sampled joint normal-form plan.
Definition 1. A CCE of an EFG is a probability distribution
x∗ ∈ X such that, for every i ∈ P , and σ′i ∈ Σi, it holds:∑
σi∈Σi
∑
σ−i∈Σ−i
x∗(σi, σ−i) (ui(σi, σ−i)− ui(σ′i, σ−i)) ≥ 0.
CCEs differ from CEs in that a CCE only requires that fol-
lowing the suggested plan is a best response in expectation,
before the recommended plan is actually revealed. In both
equilibrium concepts, the entire probability distribution ac-
cording to which recommendations are drawn is revealed
before the game starts. After that, each player commits to
playing a normal-form plan (see Appendix A for further
details on the various notions of correlated equilibrium in
EFGs). An NE (Nash, 1951) is a CCE which can be written
as a product of players’ normal-form strategies x∗i ∈ Xi.
In conclusion, an ε-CCE is a relaxation of a CCE in which
every player has an incentive to deviate less than or equal to
ε (the same definition holds true for ε-CE and ε-NE).
2.2. Regret and regret minimization
In the online convex optimization framework (Zinkevich,
2003), each player i plays repeatedly against an unknown
environment by making a series of decisions x1i , x
2
i , . . . , x
t
i.
In the basic setting, the decision space of player i is the
whole normal-form strategy space Xi. At iteration t, after
selecting xti, player i observes a utility u
t
i(x
t
i). The cumula-
tive external regret of player i up to iteration T is defined as
RTi = max
xˆi∈Xi
T∑
t=1
uti(xˆi)−
T∑
t=1
uti(x
t
i). (1)
A regret minimizer is a function providing the next player
i’s strategy xt+1i on the basis of the past history of play and
the observed utilities up to iteration t. A desirable prop-
erty for regret minimizers is Hannan consistency (Hannan,
1957), which requires that lim supT→∞
1
TR
T
i ≤ 0, i.e., the
cumulative regret grows at a sublinear rate in the number of
iterations T .
In an EFG, the regret can be defined at each infoset. Af-
ter T iterations, the cumulative regret for not having se-
lected action a ∈ A(I) at infoset I ∈ Ii (denoted by
RTI (a)) is the cumulative difference in utility that player
i would have experienced by selecting a at I instead of
following the behavioral strategy piti at each iteration t up
to T . Then, the regret for player i at infoset I ∈ Ii is
defined as RTI = maxa∈A(I)R
T
I (a). Moreover, we let
RT,+I (a) = max{RTI (a), 0}.
RM (Hart & Mas-Colell, 2000) is the most widely adopted
regret-minimizing scheme when the decision space is Xi
(e.g., in normal-form games). In the context of EFGs, RM
is usually applied locally at each infoset, where the player
selects a distribution over available actions proportionally to
their positive regret. Specifically, at iteration T + 1 player i
selects actions a ∈ A(I) according to the following proba-
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Figure 1. On the left, an example of game for the reduction of Theorem 1, where V = {x, y, z}, C = {φ1, φ2, φ3}, φ1 = x, φ2 = x¯∨ y,
and φ3 = x¯ ∨ y. On the right, an example of game for the reduction of Theorem 2, with V and C as before.
bility distribution:
piT+1i,I,a =

RT,+I (a)∑
a′∈A(I) R
T,+
I (a
′)
, if
∑
a′∈A(I)R
T,+
I (a
′) > 0
1
|A(I)| , otherwise
.
Playing according to RM at each iteration guarantees, on it-
eration T , RTI ≤ ∆
√
|A(I)|√
T
(Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2006).
CFR (Zinkevich et al., 2008) is an anytime algorithm to
compute ε-NEs in two-player, zero-sum EFGs. CFR mini-
mizes the external regret RTi by employing RM locally at
each infoset. In two-player, zero-sum games, if both play-
ers have cumulative regrets such that 1TR
T
i ≤ ε, then their
average behavioral strategies are a 2ε-NE (Waugh, 2009).
CFR+ is a variation of classical CFR which exhibits better
practical performances (Tammelin et al., 2015). However, it
uses alternation (i.e., it alternates which player updates her
regret on each iteration), which complicates the theoretical
analysis to prove convergence (Farina et al., 2018b; Burch
et al., 2018).
3. Hardness of approximating optimal CCEs
We address the following question: given an EFG, can we
find a social-welfare-maximizing CCE in polynomial time?
As shown by Celli et al. (2019), the answer is yes in two-
player EFGs without Nature. Here, we give a negative
answer to the question in the remaining cases, i.e., two-
player EFGs with Nature (Theorem 1) and EFGs with three
or more players without Nature (Theorem 2). Specifically,
we provide an even stronger negative result: there is no
polynomial-time approximation algorithm which finds a
CCE whose value approximates that of a social-welfare-
maximizing CCE up to any polynomial factor in the input
size unless P = NP. 1 We prove our results by means of
1Formally, an r-approximation algorithmA for an optimization
problem is such that OPTAPX ≤ r, where OPT is the value of an
a reduction from SAT, a well known NP-complete prob-
lem (Garey & Johnson, 1979), which reads as follows.
Definition 2 (SAT). Given a finite set C of clauses defined
over a finite set V of variables, is there a truth assignment
to the variables which satisfies all clauses?
For clarity, Figure 1 shows concrete examples of the EFGs
employed for the reductions of Theorems 1 and 2. Here, we
only provide proof sketches, while we report full proofs in
Appendix B.
Theorem 1. Given a two-player EFG with Nature, the prob-
lem of computing a social-welfare-maximizing CCE is not
in Poly-APX unless P = NP. 2
Proof sketch. An example of our reduction from SAT is pro-
vided on the left of Figure 1. Its main idea is the following:
player 2 selects a truth assignment to the variables, while
player 1 chooses a literal for each clause in order to satisfy it.
It can be proved that there exists a CCE in which each player
gets utility 1 if and only if SAT is satisfiable (as player 1
selects aI), otherwise player 1 plays aO in any CCE and its
social welfare is ε. Assume there is a a polynomial-time
poly(η)-approximation algorithm A. If SAT is satisfiable,
A would return a CCE with social welfare at least 2poly(η) .
Since, for η sufficiently large it holds 2poly(η) >
1
2η , then A
would allow us to decide in polynomial time whether SAT
is satisfiable, leading to a contradiction unless P = NP.
Theorem 2. Given a three-player EFG without Nature, the
problem of computing a social-welfare-maximizing CCE is
not in Poly-APX unless P = NP.
optimal solution and APX is the value of the solution returned by
A. See (Ausiello et al., 2012) for additional details.
2Poly-APX is the class of optimization problems that admit a
polynomial-time poly(η)-approximation algorithm, where poly(η)
is a polynomial function of the input size η (Ausiello et al., 2012).
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σL σR
σL 1, 1 1, 0
σR 0, 1 1, 1
Figure 2. Game where x¯T1 ⊗ x¯T2 does not converge to a CCE.
Proof sketch. An example of our reduction from SAT is
provided on the right of Figure 1. It is based on the same idea
as that of the previous proof, where the uniform probability
distribution played by Nature is simulated by a particular
game gadget (requiring a third player).
4. CFR in multi-player general-sum
sequential games
In this section, we first highlight why CFR cannot be directly
employed when computing CCEs of general-sum games.
Then, we show a simple way to amend it.
4.1. Convergence to CCEs in general-sum games
When players follow strategies recommended by a regret
minimizer, the empirical frequency of play approaches the
set of CCEs (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2006). Suppose
that, at time t, the players play a joint normal-form plan
σt ∈ Σ drawn according to their current strategies. Then,
the empirical frequency of play after T iterations is de-
fined as the joint probability distribution x¯T ∈ X such
that x¯T (σ) := |t≤T :σ
t=σ|
T for every σ ∈ Σ. However,
vanilla CFR and its most popular variations (such as, e.g.,
CFR+ (Tammelin et al., 2015) and DCFR (Brown & Sand-
holm, 2018a)) do not keep track of the empirical frequency
of play, as they only keep track of the players’ average
behavioral strategies. This ensures that the strategies are
compactly represented, but it is not sufficient to recover
a CCE in multi-player, general-sum games. Indeed, it is
possible to show that, even in normal-form games, if the
players play according to some regret-minimizing strategies,
then the product distribution x ∈ X resulting from players’
(marginal) average strategies may not converge to a CCE. In
order to see this, we provide the following simple example.
Example Consider the two-player normal-form game de-
picted in Figure 2. At iteration t, let players’ strategies
xt1, x
t
2 be such that x
t
1(σL) = x
t
2(σL) = (t + 1) mod 2.
Clearly, ut1(x
t) = ut2(x
t) = 1 for any t. For both players,
at iteration t, the regret of not having played σL is 0, while
the regret of σR is −1 if and only if t is even, otherwise it is
0. As a result, after T iterations, RT1 = R
T
2 = 0, and, thus,
xt1 and x
t
2 minimize the cumulative external regret. Players’
average strategies x¯T1 =
1
T
∑T
t=1 x
t
1 and x¯
T
2 =
1
T
∑T
t=1 x
t
2
converge to ( 12 ,
1
2 ) as T → ∞. However, x ∈ X such
that x(σ) = 14 for every σ ∈ Σ is not a CCE of the game.
100 101 102 103 104 105
0
0.2
0.4
Iterations
ε
x¯T
x¯T1 ⊗ x¯T2
Figure 3. Approximation attained by x¯T and x¯T1 ⊗ x¯T2 .
Algorithm 1 CFR-S for player i
1: function CFR-S(Γ,i)
2: Initialize a regret minimizer for each I ∈ Ii
3: t← 1
4: while t < T do
5: σti ← RECOMMEND(I∅)
6: Observe uti(σi) := ui(σi, σt−i)
7: UPDATE(I∅, σti , uti)
8: t← t+ 1
Indeed, a player is always better off playing σL, obtain-
ing a utility of 1, while she only gets 34 if she chooses to
stick to x. We remark that x¯T converges, as T → ∞, to
x ∈ X : x(σL, σL) = x(σR, σR) = 12 , which is a CCE.
The example above employs handpicked regret-minimizing
strategies, but similar examples can be easily found when
applying common regret minimizers. As an illustrative
case, Figure 3 shows, that, even with a simple variation of
the Shapley game (see Appendix C), the outer product of
the average strategies x¯T1 ⊗ x¯T2 obtained via RM does not
converge to a CCE as T →∞. It is clear that the same issue
may (and does, see Figures 5 and 7) happen when directly
applying CFR to general-sum EFGs.
4.2. CFR with sampling (CFR-S)
Motivated by the previous examples, we describe a simple
variation of CFR guaranteeing approachability to the set
of CCEs even in multi-player, general-sum EFGs. Vanilla
CFR proceeds as follows (see Subsection 2.2 for the details):
for each iteration t, and for each infoset I ∈ Ii, player i
observes the realized utility for each action a ∈ A(I), and
then computes piti,I according to standard RM. Once pi
t
i,I has
been computed, it is used by the regret minimizers of infos-
ets on the path from the root to I so as to compute observed
utilities. We propose CFR with sampling (CFR-S) as a sim-
ple way to keep track of the empirical frequency of play.
The basic idea is letting each player i, at each t, draw σti
according to her current strategy. Algorithm 1 describes the
structure of CFR-S, where function RECOMMEND builds a
normal-form plan σti by sampling, at each I ∈ Ii, an action
5
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in A(I) according to piti computed via RM, and UPDATE
updates the average regrets local to each regret minimizer
by propagating utilities according to σti . Each player i expe-
riences utilities depending, at each t, on the sampled plans
σt−i (Line 6). Joint normal form plans σ
t := (σti , σ
t
−i) can
be easily stored to compute the empirical frequency of play.
We state the following (see Appendix C for detailed proofs):
Theorem 3. The empirical frequency of play x¯T obtained
with CFR-S converges to a CCE almost surely, for T →∞.
Moreover, the cumulative regret grows as O(T−1/2). This
result is in line with the approach of Hart & Mas-Colell
(2000) in normal-form games. Despite its simplicity, we
show (see Section 6 for an experimental evaluation) that it is
possible to achieve better perfomances via a smarter recon-
struction technique that keeps CFR deterministic, avoiding
any sampling step.
5. CFR with joint distribution reconstruction
(CFR-Jr)
We design a new method—called CFR with joint distribu-
tion reconstruction (CFR-Jr)—to enhance CFR so as to ap-
proach the set of CCEs in multi-player, general-sum EFGs.
Differently from the naive CFR-S algorithm, CFR-Jr does
not sample normal-form plans, thus avoiding any stochastic-
ity.
The main idea behind CFR-Jr is to keep track of the av-
erage joint probability distribution x¯T ∈ X arising from
the regret-minimizing strategies built with CFR. Formally,
x¯T = 1T
∑T
t=1 x
t, where xt ∈ X is the joint probability dis-
tribution defined as the product of the players’ normal-form
strategies at iteration t. At each t, CFR-Jr computes piti with
CFR’s update rules, and then constructs a strategy xti ∈ Xi
which is realization equivalent (i.e., it induces the same prob-
ability distribution on the terminal nodes, see (Shoham &
Leyton-Brown, 2008) for a formal definition) to piti . We do
this efficiently by directly working on the game tree, with-
out resorting to the normal-form representation. Strategies
xti are then employed to compute x
t. The pseudocode of
CFR-Jr is provided in Appendix D.
Algorithm 2 shows a polynomial-time procedure to compute
a normal-form strategy xi ∈ Xi realization equivalent to
a given behavioral strategy pii. The algorithm maintains a
vector ω which is initialized with the probabilities of reach-
ing the terminal nodes by playing pii (Line 3), and it works
by iteratively assigning probability to normal-form plans so
as to induce the same distribution of ω over Z. 3 In order
for this to work, at each iteration, the algorithm must pick
3Vector ω is a realization-form strategy, as defined by Farina
et al. (2018a, Definition 2).
Algorithm 2 Reconstruct xi from pii
1: function NF-STRATEGY-RECONSTRUCTION(pii)
2: X← ∅ .X is a dictionary defining xi
3: ωz ← ρpiiz ∀z ∈ Z
4: while ω > 0 do
5: σ¯i ← arg maxσi∈Σi minz∈Z(σi) ωz
6: ω¯ ← minz∈Z(σ¯i) ωi(z)
7: X← X ∪ (σ¯i, ω¯)
8: ω ← ω − ω¯ ρσ¯i
return xi built from the pairs inX
a normal-form plan σ¯i ∈ Σi which maximizes the mini-
mum (remaining) probability ωz over the terminal nodes
z ∈ Z(σ¯i) reachable when playing σ¯i (Line 5). Then, the
probabilities ωz for z ∈ Z(σ¯i) are decreased by the mini-
mum (remaining) probability ω¯ corresponding to σ¯i, and σ¯i
is assigned probability ω¯ in xi. The algorithm terminates
when the vector ω is zeroed, returning a normal-form strat-
egy xi realization equivalent to pii. This is formally stated
by the following result, which also provides a polynomial
(in the size of the game tree) upper bound on the running
time of the algorithm and on the support size of the returned
normal-form strategy xi. 4
Theorem 4. Algorithm 2 outputs a normal-form strategy
xi ∈ Xi realization equivalent to a given behavioral strat-
egy pii, and it runs in time O(|Z|2). Moreover, xi has sup-
port size at most |Z|.
Intuitively, the result in Theorem 4 (its full proof is in Ap-
pendix D) relies on the crucial observation that, at each
iteration, there is at least one terminal node z ∈ Z whose
corresponding probability ωz is zeroed during that iteration.
The algorithm is guaranteed to terminate since each ωz is
never negative, which is the case given how the normal-
form plans are selected (Line 5), and since the game has
perfect recall. This guarantees that the algorithm eventually
terminates in at most |Z| iterations.
Finally, the following theorem (whose full proof is in Ap-
pendix D) proves that the average distribution x¯T obtained
with CFR-Jr approaches the set of CCEs. Formally:
Theorem 5. If 1TR
T
i ≤ ε for each player i ∈ P , then x¯T
obtained with CFR-Jr is an ε-CCE.
This is a direct consequence of the connection between
regret-minimizing procedures and CCEs, and of the fact
that x¯T is obtained by averaging the products of normal-
form strategies which are equivalent to regret-minimizing
behavioral strategies obtained with CFR.
4Given a normal-form strategy xi ∈ Xi, its support is defined
as the set of σi ∈ Σi such that xi(σi) > 0.
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Game Tree size CFR-S CFR-Jr CG#infosets α = 0.05 α = 0.005 α = 0.0005 swAPX/swOPT α = 0.05 α = 0.005 α = 0.0005 swAPX/swOPT
K3-6 72 1.41s 9h15m > 24h - 1.03s 13.41s 11m21s - 3h47m
K3-7 84 4.22s 17h11m > 24h - 2.35s 14.33s 51m27s - 14h37m
K3-10 120 22.69s > 24h > 24h - 7.21s 72.78s 4h11m - > 24h
L3-4 1200 10m33s > 24h > 24h - 1m15s 6h10s > 24h - > 24h
L3-6 2664 2h5m > 24h > 24h - 2m40s 11h19m > 24h - > 24h
L3-8 4704 13h55m > 24h > 24h - 20m22s > 24h > 24h - > 24h
G2-4-A? 4856 10m31s > 24h > 24h 0.979 20m23m 11h4m > 24h 0.994 > 24h
G2-4-DA? 4856 2m1s 3h28m 4h17m 0.918 1m36 56m6s > 24h 0.976 > 24h
G2-4-DH? 4856 1m19s 2h7m 3h28m 0.918 1m51s 1h5m > 24h 0.976 > 24h
G2-4-AL? 4856 2m3s 1h33m 4h20m 0.919 1m48s 55m43s > 24h 0.976 > 24h
G3-4-A? 98508 1h33m > 24h > 24h 0.996 1h3m 4h13m > 24h 0.999 > 24h
G3-4-DA? 98508 1h13m > 24h > 24h 0.987 12m18s 1h50m > 24h 1.000 > 24h
G3-4-DH? 98508 47m33s 19h40m > 24h 0.886 16m38s 4h8m 15h27m 1.000 > 24h
G3-4-AL? 98508 32m34s 15h32m 17h30m 0.692 1h21m 5h2s > 24h 0.730 > 24h
R3-12? 3071 1m44s 35m38s 3h8m 0.907 16.94s 3m19s 24m6s 0.897 > 24h
R3-15? 24542 21m30s 4h28m 7h50m 0.924 3m34s 14m53s 3h3m 0.931 > 24h
Figure 4. Comparison between the run time and the social welfare of CFR-S, CFR-Jr (for various levels of accuracy α), and the CG
algorithm. General-sum instances are marked with ?. Results of CFR-S are averaged over 50 runs. We generated 20 instances for each
Rp-d family.
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Figure 5. Left: Convergence rate attained in G2-4-DA. Right: So-
cial welfare attained in G2-4-DA.
6. Experimental evaluation
We experimentally evaluate CFR-Jr, comparing its perfor-
mance with that of CFR-S, CFR, and the state-of-the-art al-
gorithm for computing optimal CCEs (denoted by CG) (Celli
et al., 2019).5 This algorithm is a variation of the simplex
method employing a column generation technique based
on a MILP pricing oracle (we use the GUROBI 8.0 MILP
solver). Notice that directly applying RM on the normal
form is not feasible, as |Σ| > 1020 even for the smallest
instances. Further results are in Appendix E.
Setup We conduct experiments on parametric instances of
3-player Kuhn poker games (Kuhn, 1950), 3-player Leduc
hold’em poker games (Southey et al., 2005), 2/3-player
Goofspiel games (Ross, 1971), and some randomly gener-
ated general-sum EFGs. The 2-player zero-sum versions
5 The only other known algorithm to compute a CCE is
by Huang & von Stengel (2008) (see also (Jiang & Leyton-Brown,
2015) for an amended version). However, this algorithm relies on
the ellipsoid method, which is inefficient in practice (Grötschel
et al., 1981).
of these games are standard benchmarks for imperfect-
information game solving. In Appendix E, we describe
their multi-player, general-sum counterparts. Each instance
is identified by parameters p and r, which denote, respec-
tively, the number of players and the number of ranks in
the deck of cards. For example, a 3-player Kuhn game with
rank 4 is denoted by Kuhn3-4, or K3-4. We use different
tie-breaking rules for the Goofspiel instances (denoted by
A, DA, DH, AL—see Appendix E). Rp-d denotes a random
game with p players, and depth of the game tree d.
Convergence We evaluate the run time required by the
algorithms to find an approximate CCE. The results are
provided in Table 4, which reports the run time needed by
CFR-S, CFR-Jr to achieve solutions with different levels
of accuracy, and the time needed by CG for reaching an
equilibrium.6 The accuracy α of the ε-CCEs reached is
defined as α = ε∆ . CFR-Jr consistently outperforms both
CFR-S and CG, being orders of magnitude faster. Figure 5,
on the left, shows the performance of CFR-Jr, CFR-S (mean
plus/minus standard deviation), and CFR over G2-4-DA in
terms of ε/∆ approximation. CFR performs dramatically
worse than CFR-S and CFR-Jr.
Social welfare Table 4 shows, for the general-sum games,
the social welfare approximation ratio between the social
welfare of the solutions returned by the algorithms (swAPX)
and the optimal social welfare (swOPT). The social wel-
fare guaranteed by CFR-Jr is always nearly optimal, which
6Table 4 only accounts for algorithms with guaranteed conver-
gence to a CCE (recall that CFR is not guaranteed to converge in
multi-player, general-sum EFGs). The original version of the CG
algorithm computes an optimal CCE. For our tests, we modified it
to stop when a feasible solution is reached.
7
ARXIV PREPRINT - OCTOBER 15, 2019
makes it a good heuristic to compute optimal CCEs. Reach-
ing a socially good equilibrium is crucial, in practice, to
make correlation credible. Figure 5, on the right, shows the
performance of CFR-Jr, CFR-S (mean plus/minus standard
deviation), and CFR over G2-4-DA in terms of social wel-
fare approximation ratio. Also in this case, CFR performs
worse than the other two algorithms.
7. Conclusions and future works
In this paper, we proved that finding an optimal (i.e., social-
welfare maximizing) CCE is not in Poly-APX, unless P =
NP, in general-sum EFGs with two players and chance or
with multiple players. We proposed CFR-Jr as an appealing
remedy to the conundrum of computing correlated strategies
for multi-player, general-sum settings with game instances
beyond toy-problems. In the future, it would be interesting
to further study how to approximate CCEs in other classes
of structured games such as, e.g., polymatrix games and con-
gestion games. Moreover, a CCE strategy profile could be
employed as a starting point to approximate tighter solution
concepts that admit some form of correlation. This could be
the case, e.g., of the TMECor (Farina et al., 2018a), which is
used to model collusive behaviors and interactions involving
teams. Finally, it would be interesting to further investigate
whether it is possible to define regret-minimizing procedures
for general EFGs leading to refinements of the CCEs, such
as CEs and EFCEs. This begets new challenging problems
in the study of how to minimize regret in structured games.
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A. Discussion of Other Solution Concepts
Based on Correlation
The classical notion of correlated equilibrium is the one
introduced by Aumann (1974) for the normal form. Its defi-
nition for EFGs is as follows, and it employs the equivalent
normal form of the game.
Definition 3. A correlated equilibrium (CE) of an EFG is a
probability distribution x∗ ∈ X such that, for every i ∈ P ,
and for every σi, σ′i ∈ Σi, it holds:∑
σ−i∈Σ−i
x∗(σi, σ−i) (ui(σi, σ−i)− ui(σ′i, σ−i)) ≥ 0.
A CE can be interpreted in terms of a mediator who, ex ante
the play, draws the joint normal-form plan σ∗ ∈ Σ accord-
ing to a publicly known x∗ ∈ X , and privately communi-
cates each recommendation σ∗i to the corresponding player.
After observing their recommended plan, each player de-
cides whether to follow it or not.
CCEs (Definition 1) differ from CEs in that a CCE only
requires that following the suggested plan is a best response
in expectation, before the recommended plan is actually
revealed. In both CE and CCE, the entire vector of rec-
ommendations σ∗, specifying a move for each infoset, is
computed before the playing phase of the game (as opposed
to other solution concepts involving communication (Forges,
1993; Myerson, 1986)).
Specifically for EFGs, von Stengel & Forges (2008) intro-
duced the notion of extensive-form correlated equilibrium
(EFCE). In this solution concept, each recommended action
is assumed to be in a sealed envelope and is revealed only
when the player reaches the relevant infoset (i.e., the infoset
where she can make that move). Therefore, EFCEs require
recommendations to be delivered during game execution,
which makes them more demanding in terms of communi-
cation requirements than CEs and CCEs. The size of the
signal that has to be sampled is the same in all the three
solution concepts, and it has polynomial size (one action
for each infoset). The following relation holds between the
sets of equilibria described above: CE ⊆ EFCE ⊆ CCE,
see (von Stengel & Forges, 2008) for further details.
B. Omitted Proofs for Inapproximability
Results
Theorem 1. Given a two-player EFG with Nature, the prob-
lem of computing a social-welfare-maximizing CCE is not
in Poly-APX unless P = NP. 7
7Poly-APX is the class of optimization problems that admit a
polynomial-time poly(η)-approximation algorithm, where poly(η)
is a polynomial function of the input size η (Ausiello et al., 2012).
Proof. We provide a reduction from SAT. Given a SAT
instance (C, V ), we build a two-player EFG with Nature
Γε(C, V ) with the following structure:
• The game starts in h∅ ∈ I∅, where player 1 chooses
an action between aI and aO. In the first case, the game
goes on with h∅ · aI = hN. Otherwise, the game ends
with u1(z) = 1 and u2(z) = −1 + ε.
• At state hN, Nature selects an action among {aφ | φ ∈
C} uniformly at random, with hN · aφ = hφ.
• Each state hφ constitutes a player 1’s infoset Iφ. At
Iφ, player 1 chooses an action in {aφ,l | l ∈ φ}, where
l denotes a literal in φ. Then, hφ · aφ,l = hφ,l.
• All states hφ,l such that l = v or l = v¯ for some v ∈ V
belong to the same player 2’s infoset Iv . At Iv , player
2 has two actions available, namely av and av¯ .
• Then, the game ends and players’ payoffs u1(z) =
u2(z) are equal to 1 if and only if z = hφ,l · al, while
they are 0 otherwise.
Intuitively, each of the 2|V | player 2’s plans corresponds to
a truth assignment τ where variable v ∈ V is set to TRUE
(resp., FALSE) if av (resp., av¯) is played at Iv . Moreover, a
player 1’s plan determines whether the game is played (aI)
or not (aO) and, in the first case, it selects one literal for
each clause φ ∈ C (corresponding to the action played at
infoset Iφ). If player 1 plays aI, Nature chooses a clause
φ ∈ C uniformly at random, and, then, the players’ payoffs
are 1 if and only if player 1 selected a literal of φ evaluating
to TRUE under τ . Thus, in this case, players’ expected
payoffs are equal to the number of literals selected by player
1 evaluating to TRUE under τ , divided by the number of
clauses |C|. As a result, if SAT is satisfiable, then there
exists a joint plan where players’ expected payoffs are equal
to 1. It is sufficient that player 2 plays the plan associated
to a satisfying truth assignment τ , while player 2 selects
a literal evaluating to TRUE under τ for each clause. This
is also a CCE with maximum social welfare equal to 2,
as it provides the players with their maximum expected
payoffs. Instead, if SAT is not satisfiable, then any CCE
must recommend player 1 to play aO at I∅, otherwise her
expected payoff would be strictly less than 1 and she would
have an incentive to deviate to action aO, reaching a payoff
of 1. Hence, in this case, any CCE has social welfare ε.
Now, let ε = 12η , where η is the size of the SAT instance
(ε can be encoded with a number of bits polynomial in
|C| and |V |). Assume there is a polynomial-time poly(η)-
approximation algorithm A. If SAT is satisfiable, A applied
to Γε(C, V ) would return a CCE with social welfare at least
2
poly(η) . Since, for η sufficiently large,
2
poly(η) >
1
2η , A
would allow us to decide in polynomial time whether SAT
is satisfiable, a contradiction unless P = NP.
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Theorem 2. Given a three-player EFG without Nature, the
problem of computing a social-welfare-maximizing CCE is
not in Poly-APX unless P = NP.
Proof. We use a reduction similar to that in Theorem 1. We
build a three-player EFG Γˆε(C, V ) such that:
• The game starts in h∅ ∈ I∅, as Γ(C, V ).
• At state hN, player 3 plays an action {aO,φ | φ ∈
C} ∪ {aI}, with hN · aI = hI, hN · aO,φ = hO,φ.
• All states hO,φ and hI belong to a player 1’s infoset IN,
where she selects an action among {aN,φ | φ ∈ C}.
• Then, if player 3 played aI, hI · aN,φ = hφ and the
games goes on as Γ(C, V ) (with player 3’s payoffs set
to zero). Instead, if player 3 played an action aO,φ, the
game ends with 2u1(z) = 2u2(z) = −u3(z) = |C||C|−1
if z = hO,φ · aN,φ′) and φ 6= φ′, while 2u1(z) =
2u2(z) = −u3(z) = −|C| if φ = φ′.
Intuitively, the introduction of a third player allows us to
simulate the random move of Nature in Γ(C, V ), since, in
any CCE of Γˆ(C, V ), player 1 is recommended to play a
uniform distribution at infoset IN and player 3 is always told
to play action aI. First, if player 3 is recommended an action
aO,φ with positive probability, then player 2 would have an
incentive to switch to action aO at I∅. Moreover, assuming
player 3 is told to play aI, if player 1 is recommended to
play some action aN,φ with probability p > 1|C| , then player
3 would have an incentive to switch to action aO,φ, as she
would get p|C| − (1 − p) |C||C|−1 > 0, while she gets 0 by
playing aI. Finally, a reasoning similar to that for Theorem 1
concludes the proof.
C. CFR-S
C.1. Example
Figure 6 reports the game employed in the experiments of
Figure 3, where the outer product of the average strategies
x¯T1 ⊗ x¯T2 obtained by RM does not converge to a CCE as
T →∞ (for x¯T1 ⊗ x¯T2 , ε of the ε-CCE has a cyclic behavior
and does not converge to zero).
C.2. Omitted Proofs
The theoretical guarantees of CFR-S can be derived via
the framework of Farina et al. (2018b), as discussed in the
following.
At each iteration t, let σti ∈ Σi be the normal-form plan
sampled by player i and σt−i ∈ Σ−i be the plans drawn
by the other players. The utility experienced by player i at
stage t is denoted by uti(σ
t
i) := ui(σ
t
i , σ
t
−i). The players’
observations in CFR-S call for a slight variation in the def-
inition of cumulative regret. After T iterations, we define
1,0 0,1 0,0
0,0 2,0 0,1
0,1 0,0 1,0
Figure 6. A simple variation of the Shapley game.
the cumulative regret experienced by player i as
R˜Ti := max
σˆi∈Σi
T∑
t=1
(
uti(σˆi)− uti(σti)
)
. (2)
The connection between the cumulative regret and the set
of CCEs remains unchanged when the regret is defined as
in Equation (2), as shown by the following result (whose
proof is similar to that of (Hart & Mas-Colell, 2000)).
Theorem 6. If lim supT→∞ 1T R˜
T
i ≤ 0 almost surely for
each player i ∈ P , then the empirical frequency of play x¯T
converges almost surely as T →∞ to the set of CCEs.
Proof. By definition of cumulative regret, and by taking its
average, we have
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
max
σˆi∈Σi
T∑
t=1
(
uti(σˆi)− uti(σti)
) ≤ 0,
which holds almost surely. Let σt := (σti , σ
t
−i). It follows
that, for each normal-form plan σˆi ∈ Σi we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
ui(σˆi, σ
t
−i)− ui(σt)
)
=∑
σ∈Σ
x¯T (σ) (ui(σˆi, σ−i)− ui(σ)) .
Where x¯T (σ) is the empirical frequency of σ after T iter-
ations. On any subsequence where x¯T converges, that is
x¯T → x∗ ∈ X , it holds almost surely, for each σˆi ∈ Σi that∑
σ∈Σ
x¯T (σ) (ui(σˆi, σ−i)− ui(σ))→∑
σ∈Σ
x∗(σ) (ui(σˆi, σ−i)− ui(σ)) .
The result immediately holds for Definition 1.
In the following, we follow the approach of Farina et al.
(2018b) to show how to decompose R˜Ti into regret terms
which are computed locally at player i’s infosets. This
allows us to avoid working with the (exponential-sized) nor-
mal form of an EFG even if R˜Ti is defined over player i’s
normal-form plans. R˜Ti can be minimized via the mini-
mization of other suitably defined regrets computed locally
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at player i’s infosets. In order to do this, we use the idea
of laminar regret decomposition (Farina et al., 2018b), but
reasoning only on vertices of Xi.
Given σi ∈ Σi, we denote by σi(I) the action selected in
σi at infoset I ∈ Ii. Moreover, σi↓I is the (sub)vector
containing the actions selected in σi at I ∈ Ii and all its
descendant infosets.
First, we denote with uti,I : A(I)→ R the immediate utility
observed by player i at infoset I ∈ Ii, during iteration
t. For every a ∈ A(I), uti,I(a) is the utility experienced
by player i if the game ends after playing a at I , without
passing through another player i’s infoset.
Then, the following is player i’s utility attainable at infoset
I ∈ Ii when a normal-form plan σˆi ∈ Σi is selected:
Vˆ tI (σˆi↓I) := u
t
i,I(σˆi↓I(I)) +
∑
I′∈CI,σˆi↓I (I)
Vˆ tI′(σˆi↓I′), (3)
where CI,a ⊆ Ii is the set of possible next player i’s infosets,
given that she played action a ∈ A(I) at infoset I ∈ Ii. We
introduce a parameterized utility function, which is used to
define regrets locally at each infoset, and reads as follows:
uˆti,I : a ∈ A(I) 7→ uti,I(a) +
∑
I′∈CI,a
Vˆ tI′(σ
t
i↓I′). (4)
The utility function uˆti,I preserves convexity of u
t
i. Finally,
we modify the notion of laminar regret, as
RˆtI := max
a∈A(I)
T∑
t=1
uˆti,I(a)−
T∑
t=1
uˆti,I(σ
t
i(I)). (5)
Let V tI := Vˆ
t
I (σ
t
i,↓I). Then, we introduce the cumulative
regret at infoset I ∈ Ii, defined as
RT↓I := max
σˆi↓I
T∑
t=1
Vˆ tI (σˆi↓I)−
T∑
t=1
V tI . (6)
Lemma 7. The cumulative regret at each infoset I ∈ Ii
can be decomposed as
RT↓I = max
a∈A(I)
(
T∑
t=1
uˆti,I(a) +
∑
I′∈CI,a
RT↓I′
− T∑
t=1
uˆti,I(σ
t
i(I)).
Proof. By definition of cumulative regret at I ∈ Ii we have
that:
RT↓I := max
σˆi↓I
T∑
t=1
Vˆ tI (σˆi↓I)−
T∑
t=1
V tI =
= max
σˆi↓I
T∑
t=1
uti,I(σˆi↓I(I)) + ∑
I′∈CI,σˆt
i↓I (I)
Vˆ tI′(σˆi↓I′)
−
T∑
t=1
V tI =
= max
a∈A(I)
 T∑
t=1
uti,I(a) +
∑
I′∈CI,a
max
σˆi↓I′
T∑
t=1
Vˆ tI′(σˆi↓I′)
−
T∑
t=1
V tI .
Then, by employing Equation (6), we get
RT↓I = max
a∈A(I)
(
T∑
t=1
uti,I(a)+
∑
I′∈CI,a
(
RT↓I′ +
T∑
t=1
V tI′
)− T∑
t=1
V tI .
Finally, we obtain the result by rewriting terms according to
Equation (4).
The following theorem shows that, in order to minimize R˜Ti ,
it is enough to minimize the laminar regret locally at each
I ∈ Ii as defined in Equation (5).
Lemma 8. The cumulative regret R˜Ti satisfies the follow-
ing:
R˜Ti ≤ max
σˆi∈Σi
∑
I∈Ii
ρσˆiI Rˆ
T
I .
Proof. Consider a generic infoset I ∈ Ii. By exploiting
Lemma 7 and Definition 5, we can write:
RT↓I = max
a∈A(I)
 T∑
t=1
uˆti,I(a) +
∑
I′∈CI,a
RT↓I′
−
T∑
t=1
uˆti,I(σ
t
i(I)) ≤
≤ max
a∈A(I)
T∑
t=1
uˆti,I(a)+max
a∈A(I)
∑
I′∈CI,a
RT↓I′−
T∑
t=1
uˆti,I(σ
t
i(I))=
= RˆTI + max
a∈A(I)
∑
I′∈CI,a
RT↓I′ .
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By starting from the root of the game and applying the above
equation inductively, we obtain our result.
The last result provides an immediate proof of the following.
Theorem 3. The empirical frequency of play x¯T obtained
with CFR-S converges to a CCE almost surely, for T →∞.
Proof. CFR-S minimizes each laminar regret RˆTI , as de-
fined in Equation (5), through standard RM, which guaran-
tees that lim supT→∞
1
T Rˆ
T
I ≤ 0 almost surely. Therefore,
lim supT→∞
1
T R˜
T
i ≤ 0 almost surely (Lemma 8), which
implies that the empirical frequency of play converges al-
most surely to a CCE for T →∞ (Theorem 6).
Finally, we observe that, at each iteration t and infoset
I ∈ Ii, σti(I) is selected according to the strategy piti,I rec-
ommended by the regret minimizer at infoset I . Thus, σti is
drawn with probability
∏
I∈Ii pi
t
i,I,σti(I)
, which is equal to
xti(σ
t
i), where x
t
i ∈ Xi is the normal-form strategy realiza-
tion equivalent to the behavioral strategy piti .
D. CFR-Jr
D.1. Algorithm Pseudocode
For the sake of completeness and clarity, in Algorithm 3
we provide the pseudocode of the CFR-Jr algorithm, which
uses a vanilla implementation of the CFR algorithm as a
subroutine.
Algorithm 3 CFR-Jr
1: function CFR-JR(Γ)
2: Initialize the joint strategy x¯ to all zeros
3: t← 0
4: while t < T do
5: for all i ∈ P do
6: piti ← CFR(Γ, i)
7: xti ← NF-STRATEGY-RECONSTRUCTION(piti)
8: x¯← x¯+⊗i∈P xti .⊗i∈P xti is joint distribution xt defined as
the product of the players’ normal-form strategies
9: t← t+ 1
10: return x¯T = x¯T
CFR-Jr maintains a variable x¯ which stores the sum of the
joint probability distributions xt (notice that it may be com-
pactly represented in polynomial space using a dictionary,
as for xi in Algorithm 2). CFR-Jr executes, at each t, an
iteration of the CFR algorithm (Line 6). In particular, the
CFR subroutine executes a step of vanilla CFR, including
the update of regrets and behavioral strategies. In addition,
at each iteration t, CFR-Jr constructs normal-form strategies
xti (one per player i ∈ P) which are realization equivalent
to the behavioral strategies piti obtained with CFR (Line 7).
Then the product xt of the players’ normal-strategies is com-
puted and added to x¯ (Line 8). Notice that x¯ is not used
by the CFR subroutine to update the players’ strategies and
regrets. Finally, CFR-Jr returns the x¯ divided by T , which
represents the average x¯T .
D.2. Omitted Proofs
In order to give the full proof of Theorem 4, we first need
to prove two technical lemmas concerning the existence of
a normal-form plan σ¯i such that ω¯ = minz∈Z(σ¯i) ωz > 0
whenever the vector ω has at least a strictly positive compo-
nent.
For ease of presentation, we introduce some additional nota-
tion. Extending the definition of Z(σi), we let Z(I, a) be
the set of terminal nodes potentially reachable from infoset
I ∈ Ii when playing action a ∈ A(I), while Z(σi, I, a) is
the set of terminal nodes potentially reachable from I after
playing action a and, then, following the actions prescribed
by the normal-form plan σi ∈ Σi. Analogously, we define
Z(I) and Z(σi, I).
Observe that, in Line 5 of Algorithm 2, the normal-form
plan σ¯i ∈ arg maxσi∈Σi minz∈Z(σi) ωz can be recursively
built, by traversing the game tree, as the set of actions {a¯ ∈
A(I) | I ∈ Ii ∧ a¯ ∈ arg maxa∈A(I) minz∈Z(σ¯i,I,a) ωz}.
This recursion is heavily exploited in the following proofs.
Lemma 9. Given σ¯i ∈ Σi constituted by actions {a¯ ∈
A(I) | I ∈ Ii ∧ a¯ ∈ arg maxa∈A(I) minz∈Z(σ¯i,I,a) ωz},
for every infoset I ∈ Ii we have that:
max
a∈A(I)
min
z∈Z(σ¯i,I,a)
ωz = 0 ⇔ ωz = 0 ∀z ∈ Z(I).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the depth of the game
tree. Let CI,a be the set of player i’s infosets immediately
reachable by playing action a ∈ A(I) at infoset I ∈ Ii.
As for the base case of the induction, let us consider an
infoset I ∈ Ii such that CI,a = ∅ for all a ∈ A(I) (i.e., one
such that no other infosets of player i may be reached after).
Observe that, due to ω being initialized using only player i’s
behavioral strategy pii, we have that ωz = ωz′ = ρpiiI pii,I,a
for all a ∈ A(I) and z, z′ ∈ Z(I, a), which in turn implies
that maxa∈A(I) minz′∈Z(σ¯i,I,a) ωz′ = maxa∈A(I) ρ
pii
I pii,I,a =
maxz′∈Z(I) ωz′ . The max of a non-negative function over
a set is zero if and only if that function is zero for all the
elements of the set, thus maxa∈A(I) minz′∈Z(σ¯i,I,a) ωz′ =
maxz′∈Z(I) ωz′ = 0 if and only if ωz = 0 for all z ∈ Z(I).
For the inductive step, let us consider a generic infoset I ∈
Ii. Observe that, if a¯ ∈ arg maxa∈A(I) minz′∈Z(σ¯i,I,a) ωz′ ,
we have Z(σ¯i, I, a¯) = Z(σ¯i, I) (since a¯ ∈ σ¯i). Moreover,
reasoning as above, we can conclude that
max
a∈A(I)
min
z′∈Z(σ¯i,I,a)
ωz′ = 0
if and only if minz′∈Z(σ¯i,I,a) ωz′ = 0 for all a ∈ A(I).
Now let us take any action a′ ∈ A(I) and any infoset I ′ ∈
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CI,a′ (it has to exist at least one, otherwise we would fall
back in the base case). Applying the observation above, we
have that
max
a∈A(I′)
min
z′∈Z(σ¯i,I′,a)
ωz′ = min
z′∈Z(σ¯i,I′,a¯)
ωz′ = min
z′∈Z(σ¯i,I′)
ωz′ .
But, being I ′ a descendant of I we have that Z(I ′) ⊆
Z(I, a′) and, in particular, also Z(σ¯i, I ′) ⊆ Z(σ¯i, I, a′).
Thus, minz′∈Z(σ¯i,I,a′) ωi(z
′) = 0 implies that
min
z′∈Z(σ¯i,I′)
ωi(z
′) = 0.
By the induction hypothesis, we have that for I ′ (which
follows I in the game tree) it holds
max
a∈A(I′)
min
z′∈Z(σ∗,I′,a)
ωi(z
′) = 0
if and only if ωi(z) = 0 for every z ∈ Z(I ′). We can now
build our final chain of double implications:
max
a∈A(I)
min
z′∈Z(σ¯i,I,a)
ωz′ = 0 ⇔ min
z′∈Z(σ¯i,I,a)
ωz′ = 0 ∀a ∈ A(I),
where, by generality of a′ and I ′, the right term holds if and
only if
max
a∈A(I′)
min
z′∈Z(σ¯i,I′,a)
ωz′ = 0 ∀a′ ∈ A(I), I ′ ∈ CI,a′ ,
which in turn holds, by inductive hypothesis, if and only if
ωz = 0 ∀z ∈ Z(I ′) ∀a′ ∈ A(I), I ′ ∈ CI,a′ .
This holds, given that
⋃
a′∈A(I),I′∈CI,a′ Z(I
′) = Z(I), if
and only if ωz = 0 for all z ∈ Z(I), which concludes the
proof.
Lemma 10. If ω > 0, then a normal-form plan σ¯i ∈
arg maxσi∈Σi minz∈Z(σi) ωz is such that minz∈Z(σ¯i) ωz >
0.
Proof. Let ∅ be the root infoset of player i. Observe
that, if a¯ ∈ arg maxa∈A(∅) minz′∈Z(σ¯i,∅,a) ωz′ , we have
Z(σ¯i) = Z(σ¯i,∅, a¯) (since a¯ ∈ σ¯i). Applying Lemma 9 to
infoset ∅, we have that maxa∈A(∅) minz′∈Z(σ¯i,∅,a) ωz′ =
minz′∈Z(σ¯i) ωz′ = 0 if and only if ωz = 0 for every
z ∈ Z(∅) = Z. Since ωz ≥ 0 for all z ∈ Z, we
have minz′∈Z(σ¯i) ωz′ > 0 if and only if ω > 0. Being
this last condition always verified within the main loop
of Algorithm 2, we have that a normal-form plan σ¯i ∈
arg maxσi∈Σi minz∈Z(σi) ωz is such that minz∈Z(σ¯i) ωz >
0.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 2 outputs a normal-form strategy
xi ∈ Xi realization equivalent to a given behavioral strat-
egy pii, and it runs in time O(|Z|2). Moreover, xi has sup-
port size at most |Z|.
Proof. Due to ω¯ ρσ¯iz being equal to ω¯ = minz∈Z(σ¯i) ωz for
all z ∈ Z(σ¯i) and equal to zero for all z 6∈ Z(σ¯i), we
have that after each iteration all components of ω are non-
negative. Moreover, at least for z¯ ∈ arg minz∈Z(σ¯i) ωz ,
we have ωz¯ = 0. Then, at each iteration, ω becomes zero
for at least one terminal node, and, given that it cannot go
below zero, we have that the vector ω is zeroed in at most
|Z| iterations. Each iteration runs in O(max{|Ii|, |Z|}), as
σ¯i can be recursively computed by iterating on the infos-
ets in a bottom-up fashion, while each ω update needs to
consider each terminal at most once. Given that for each
non-degenerate game tree (i.e., A(I) > 1 for all I ∈ Ii) we
have |Ii| ≤ |Z|, the overall complexity of the algorithm is
O(|Z|2).
As a consequence of ω becoming zero for some z ∈ Z(σ¯i)
at each iteration, and given that σ¯i is built in such a way
that ωz > 0 for all z ∈ Z(σ¯i), no normal-form plan is ever
selected more than once as σ¯i. Then, the support of xi has
size equal to the number of normal-form plans σ¯i selected
at each iteration of Algorithm 2, which is at most |Z|.
Let k¯ be the number of iterations, and σ¯ki be the normal-form
plan reconstructed at iteration k. By recursively expanding
the equation ωz ← ωz − ω¯ ρσ¯iz we can obtain the following
(for clarity, we add apices indicating the iteration):
ωk¯z = ω
k¯−1
z − ρσ¯
k¯
i
z min
z′∈Z(σ¯k¯−1i )
ωk¯−1z′ =
= ωk¯−2z − ρσ¯
k¯−1
i
z min
z′∈Z(σ¯k¯−2i )
ωk¯−2z′ − ρσ¯
k¯
i
z min
z′∈Z(σ¯k¯−1i )
ωk¯−1z′ =
= . . . = ω0z −
∑
k=1,..,k¯
ρ
σ¯ki
z min
z′∈Z(σ¯k−1i )
ωk−1z′ = 0,
which gives
ωz =
∑
k=1,..,k¯
ρ
σ¯ki
z min
z′∈Z(σ¯k−1i )
ωk−1z′ .
Finally, we show that xi and pii are realization equivalent by
checking that they force the same probability distribution
over Z. We have:∑
σi∈Σi
ρσiz xi(σi) =
∑
σi∈{σ¯ki |k=1,..,k¯}
ρσiz xi(σi) =
∑
k=1,..,k¯
ρ
σ¯ki
z xi(σ¯
k
i ) =
∑
k=1,..,k¯
ρ
σ¯ki
z min
z′∈Z(σ¯k−1i )
ωk−1z′ = ρ
pii
z .
This concludes the proof.
Theorem 5. If 1TR
T
i ≤ ε for each player i ∈ P , then x¯T
obtained with CFR-Jr is an ε-CCE.
Proof. First, let us recall that xt ∈ X is defined in such a
way that xt(σ) =
∏
i∈P x
t
i(σi) for every joint normal-form
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plan σ ∈ Σ, with σ = (σi)i∈P . By assumption, 1TRTi ≤ ε
implies the following:
max
σˆi∈Σi
 T∑
t=1
∑
σ−i∈Σ−i
ui(σˆi, σ−i)
∏
j 6=i∈P
xtj(σj)−
T∑
t=1
∑
σi∈Σi
σ−i∈Σ−i
ui(σi, σ−i)
∏
j∈P
xtj(σj)
 ≤ εT.
Moreover, since the condition holds for every i ∈ P , by
re-writing the max operator we get
T∑
t=1
∑
σ−i∈Σ−i
ui(σˆi, σ−i)
∏
j 6=i∈P
xtj(σj)−
T∑
t=1
∑
σi∈Σi
σ−i∈Σ−i
ui(σi, σ−i)
∏
j∈P
xtj(σj) ≤ εT ∀i ∈ P, σˆi ∈ Σi.
Since
∑
σi∈Σi x
t
i(σi) = 1, it follows that∑
σ−i∈Σ−i
ui(σˆi, σ−i)
∏
j 6=i∈P
xtj(σj)
i s equal to∑
σi∈Σi
∑
σ−i∈Σ−i
ui(σˆi, σ−i)
∏
j∈P
xtj(σj)
. Thus,
T∑
t=1
∑
σi∈Σi
σ−i∈Σ−i
∏
j∈P
xtj(σj) (ui(σˆi, σ−i)−
ui(σi, σ−i)) ≤ εT ∀i ∈ P, σˆi ∈ Σi.
Using the definition of x¯T , we obtain∑
σi∈Σi
σ−i∈Σ−i
x¯T (σi, σ−i) (ui(σˆi, σ−i)−
ui(σi, σ−i)) ≤ ε ∀i ∈ P, σˆi ∈ Σi,
which proves that x¯T is an ε-CCE.
E. Additional Details on the Experimental
Evaluation
In this section we provide further details on the experimental
evaluation.
E.1. Experimental Setup
The multi-player games instances that we employ are struc-
tured as follows.
Kuhn Poker. In Kuhn3-r (K3-r), each player initially pays
one chip to the pot, and is dealt a single private card. Then,
players act in turns. The first player may check or bet, that is
paying an additional chip to the pot. The second player can
either fold/call the bet, or check/bet after an initial check of
the first player. At this point, if no bets have been placed, the
third player decides between checking or betting. Otherwise,
she can either fold or call. If the third player bets, then the
others have to choose between folding or calling. At the
showdown, the player with the highest card who has not
folded wins all the chips in the pot.
Leduc Hold’em Poker. We employ larger three-player
variants than the two-player version usually employed, see,
e.g., (Southey et al., 2005). In our enlarged variants, Leduc3-
r (L3-r) contains three suits and r ≥ 3 card ranks (i.e., it
contains triples of cards A, 2, . . . , r for a total of 3 r cards).
Each player initially pays one chip to the pot, and is dealt
a single private card. After a first round of betting (with
betting parameter k1), a community card is dealt face up.
Then, a second round of betting is played (with betting
parameter k2). Finally, a showdown occurs and players that
did not fold reveal their private cards. If a player pairs her
card with the community card, she wins the pot. Otherwise,
the player with the highest private card wins. If more players
pair their card with the community card, or if no pair is made
but more players have the same private card, there is a draw
and the pot is equally split between the winning players.
Betting rounds follow the same rules of Kuhn Poker. We set
k1 = 2 and k2 = 4. These are the numbers of chips that a
player has to pay to bet/call in the first and second round of
betting, respectively.
Goofspiel. In addition to Poker games, we consider the
game of Goofspiel. In this game, cards rank A (low), 2,
. . ., 10, J, Q, K (high). When scoring points, the Ace is
worth 1 point, cards 2-10 their face value, Jack 11, Queen
12, and King 13. Goofspielp-r (p is the number of players)
employs p + 1 suits, each containing cards A, . . .,r. One
suit is singled out as the prizes. The prizes are shuffled and
placed between the players, with the top card turned face
up. Each of the remaining suits becomes the hand of one
of the players. The game proceeds in rounds. Each player
selects a card from her hand, keeping her choice secret
from the opponent. Once all players have selected a card,
they are simultaneously revealed, and the player with the
highest bid wins the prize card. We employ the following tie
breaking rules to obtain different kinds of instances. Some
of them (e.g., Accumulate) are almost constant-sum games
(i.e., constant sum for all but few outcomes), while others
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(e.g., Discard always) present larger differences in the sum
of payoffs attainable at different terminal nodes:
• Accumulate (A): the prize card goes to the player that
selected the highest unique card. If all players selected
the same card, the prize card is taken aside and the
game continues unveiling the next one: the winner (if
any) of the new round will take both prize cards. The
process is repeated until the tie is broken or the game
ends, in which case all prize cards that have been taken
aside are discarded.
• Discard-if-all (DA): the prize card goes to the player
that selected the highest unique card; if all players
selected the same card, the prize card is discarded.
• Discard-if-high (DH): if the tie is on the highest-valued
card, then the prize card is discarded; otherwise, the
prize card goes to the player that selected the highest
unique card.
• Discard always (AL): the prize card is discarded and
the game goes on with the next round.
The game ends when the players terminate their cards. Play-
ers calculate their final utility by summing up the value of
the prize cards they won.
E.2. Full Experimental Results
CFR, CFR-S and CFR-Jr algorithms have all been imple-
mented in the Python 3 language, while CG employs the
GUROBI 8.0 MILP solver to solve the pricing problems.
All the experiments are run with a 24 hours time-limit on a
UNIX machine with a total of 32 cores working at 2.3 GHz,
equipped with 128 GB of RAM.
We tested CFR-Jr also on some extensive-form variants of
the Shapley game, a normal-form general-sum 3x3 game
that has been shown to induce cyclic non-convergent behav-
iors in iterative algorithms such as Fictitious Play (Jafari
et al., 2001). The results in Figures 7–8 clearly show that
also CFR can get stuck in non-convergent cycles, confirm-
ing what we observed in Figure 5. This is well known in
theory (there is no guarantee of convergence for CFR in
general-sum games, even if two-player and no chance) but,
to the best of out knowledge, was never observed in practice.
Note that also CFR-S has some difficulties in reaching low
values of ε, while CFR-Jr reaches a good approximation of
an equilibrium point in few iterations. The game we used
for this experiment is structured as follows:
• There is a set of three cards, numbered 0 to 2.
• Player 1 plays a card out of the set, then Player 2 plays
a hidden card out of the set, and finally Player 1 plays
again a card out of the three.
• If the sum of the cards that have been played is 0 mod
3, then the utility is (0, 0), if the sum is 1 mod 3, it is
(1, 0), and if it is 2 mod 3, then the players receive a
utility of (0, 1).
• If the two cards played are equal in value, than the
utility gained by each of the played is doubled (this step
is fundamental to ensure that the uniform probability
over the joint set of actions is not a CCE).
E.3. CFR-Jr With Different Joint Distribution
Reconstruction Rates
From a theoretical standpoint, CFR-Jr requires a joint distri-
bution reconstruction step to be carried out at every iteration
t, to ensure that the resulting normal-form joint strategy
approaches the set of CCEs (see Theorem 5). We investi-
gate whether it is possible to trade some accuracy to reduce
the computational time of the algorithm, by performing
the joint distribution reconstruction at a subset of the itera-
tions. This could also allow the algorithm to store smaller
normal-form strategies, by skipping the reconstruction dur-
ing the first iterations. Indeed, during the first iterations,
CFR (and, therefore, CFR-Jr) produces behavioral strate-
gies that tend to be fairly uniformly distributed over all the
possible actions, leading to ωs assigning some probability
to all terminals. This implies the reconstructed normal-form
strategies, in the first iterations, have considerably large
supports.
Algorithm 4 CFR-Jr-k
1: function CFR-JR(Γ)
2: Initialize the joint strategy x¯ to all zeros
3: t← 0
4: while t < T do
5: for all i ∈ P do
6: piti ← CFR(Γ, i)
7: if t mod k = 0 then
8: xti ← NF-STRATEGY-RECONSTRUCTION(piti)
9: if t mod k = 0 then
10: x¯← x¯+⊗i∈P xti .⊗i∈P xti is joint distribution xt defined
as the product of the players’ normal-form strategies
11: t← t+ 1
return x¯T = x¯⌊
T
k
⌋
These considerations suggest that a slight modification of the
CFR-Jr algorithm, that we call CFR-Jr-k (see Algorithm 4),
may perform better in some settings. The idea behind CFR-
Jr-k is that the reconstruction procedure is carried out only
every k iterations. We have evaluated CFR-Jr-k for different
values of k. In all the tests we performed, the CFR-Jr algo-
rithm always showed good convergence. In Figures 9–11,
we report the experimental results related to instances of
Kuhn3-6. The plots show both the convergence speed in
terms of number of iterations and in terms of run time, as
well as the size of the support of the average joint strategy
that was stored by the algorithm (which is always mono-
tonically increasing by construction). In Figures 12–14,
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Game Tree size ∆ CFR-S CG#infosets α = 0.1 α = 0.05 α = 0.01 α = 0.005 α = 0.001 α = 0.0005 swAPX/swOPT
K3-6 72 6 0.22s 1.41s 24m20s 9h15m > 24h > 24h - 3h47m
K3-7 84 6 0.62s 4.22s 1h3m 17h11m > 24h > 24h - 14h37m
K3-10 120 6 1.89s 22.69s 11h19m > 24h > 24h > 24h - > 24h
L3-4 1200 21 4.0s 10m33s > 24h > 24h > 24h > 24h - > 24h
L3-6 2664 21 21.54s 2h5m > 24h > 24h > 24h > 24h - > 24h
L3-8 4704 21 35.3s 13h55m > 24h > 24h > 24h > 24h - > 24h
G2-4-A? 4856 10 1m11s 10m31s 27h3m > 24h > 24h > 24h 0.979 > 24h
G2-4-DA? 4856 10 12.83s 2m1s 53m28s 3h28m 4h48m 4h17m 0.918 > 24h
G2-4-DH? 4856 10 11.56s 1m19s 42m18s 2h7m 3h19m 3h28m 0.918 > 24h
G2-4-AL? 4856 10 15.01s 2m3s 43m18s 1h33m 4h4m 4h20m 0.919 > 24h
G3-4-A? 98508 10 6m19s 1h33m > 24h > 24h > 24h > 24h 0.995 > 24h
G3-4-DA? 98508 10 9m17s 1h13m 17h12m > 24h > 24h > 24h 0.986 > 24h
G3-4-DH? 98508 10 5m24s 47m33s 11h51m 19h40m 22h11m > 24h 0.886 > 24h
G3-4-AL? 98508 10 2m23s 32m34s 10h25m 15h32m 14h36m 17h30m 0.692 > 24h
R3-12? 3071 1 45.0s 1m44s 13m10s 35m38s 10h8m 3h8m 0.906 > 24h
R3-15? 24542 1 10m5s 21m30s 2h5m 4h28m 3h25m 7h50m 0.924 > 24h
Table 1. Running times and social welfare obtained by the CFR-S algorithm (for various levels of accuracy), and the CG algorithm.
General-sum instances are marked with ?.
Game Tree size ∆ CFR-Jr CG#infosets α = 0.1 α = 0.05 α = 0.01 α = 0.005 α = 0.001 α = 0.0005 swAPX/swOPT
K3-6 72 6 1.03s 1.03s 4.55s 13.41s 1m7s 11m21s - 3h47m
K3-7 84 6 2.35s 2.35s 7.92s 14.33s 10m49s 51m27s - 14h37m
K3-10 120 6 7.21s 7.21s 17.2s 72.78s 31m41s 4h11m - > 24h
L3-4 1200 21 1.72s 1m15s 1h1m 6h10m > 24h > 24h - > 24h
L3-6 2664 21 8.2s 2m40s 2h35m 1h19m > 24h > 24h - > 24h
L3-8 4704 21 7m44s 20m22s 17h32m > 24h > 24h > 24h - > 24h
G2-4-A? 4856 10 5m28s 20m23s 4h3m 11h4m > 24h > 24h 0.994 > 24h
G2-4-DA? 4856 10 1m3s 1m36s 14m31s 56m6s > 24h > 24h 0.976 > 24h
G2-4-DH? 4856 10 1m10s 1m51s 16m27s 1h5m > 24h > 24h 0.976 > 24h
G2-4-AL? 4856 10 1m10s 1m48s 15m2s 55m43s > 24h > 24h 0.976 > 24h
G3-4-A? 98508 10 1h21s 1h3m 3h3m 4h13m 5h4m > 24h 0.999 > 24h
G3-4-DA? 98508 10 9m25s 12m18s 1h1m 1h50m > 24h > 24h 1.000 > 24h
G3-4-DH? 98508 10 13m59s 16m38s 2h21m 4h8m 8h50m 15h27m 1.000 > 24h
G3-4-AL? 98508 10 13m55s 1h21m 1h38m 5m2s > 24h > 24h 0.730 > 24h
R3-12? 3052 1 7.67s 16.94s 1m37s 3m19s 17m1s 24m6s 0.897 > 24h
R3-15? 24588 1 3m10s 3m34s 9m1s 14m53s 1h19m 3h3m 0.931 > 24h
Table 2. Running times and social welfare obtained by the CFR-Jr algorithm (for various levels of accuracy), and the CG algorithm.
General-sum instances are marked with ?.
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Figure 7. Convergence in number of iterations for the Shap-
ley game
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Figure 8. Social welfare attained with respect to the optimal
one for the Shapley game
we report the experimental results related to instances of
Kuhn3-10.
In regard to the performances, larger reconstruction rates let
the algorithm complete the same amount of iterations in a
shorter time. On the other hand, smaller reconstruction rates
can lead earlier to a good joint strategy, and hence to reach
lower values of ε. There is a trade-off between iteration
speed and reconstruction accuracy, which can be exploited
to tackle different problems with the most suited level of
precision.
For what regards the size of the support of the joint aver-
age strategy, we can clearly see that lower reconstruction
rates, running more times the reconstruction algorithm in
the same amount of time, and being more susceptible to
high-frequency variations in the behavioral strategies built
by CFR, require up to ten time more space to store their
joint strategies.
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Figure 9. K3-6. Convergence in number
of iterations for CFR-Jr with different re-
construction rates
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Figure 10. K3-6. Convergence in run
time (seconds) for CFR-Jr with different
reconstruction rates
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Figure 11. K3-6. Size of the support of
the joint strategy obtained from CFR-Jr
with different reconstruction rates
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Figure 12. K3-10. Convergence in num-
ber of iterations for CFR-Jr with different
reconstruction rates
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Figure 13. K3-10. Convergence in run
time (seconds) for CFR-Jr with different
reconstruction rates
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Figure 14. K3-10. Size of the support of
the joint strategy obtained from CFR-Jr
with different reconstruction rates
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